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Abstract 
Media play a key role in shaping who ‘we’ are – not just on an individual level, but also on 
a national level. However, to define the Self, we need an Other – which can then shapeshift 
in order to fit the discourse required. Making use of examples from Japan and the UK, two 
countries with a strong sense of national ‘uniqueness’, I will look at how the media 
construct ‘Otherness’ in both countries, who these Others are and how they are 
appropriated. Thus, in times in which nationalist movements are on the rise, it becomes 
even more important to look at how the media contribute to or dismantle nationalistic 
debates.  
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1. Introduction – Them or Us?  
Media continue to affect notions of who ‘we’ are, “provid[ing] the models 
of what it means to be male or female, successful or a failure, powerful or 
powerless. Media culture also provides the materials out of which many people 
construct their sense of class, of ethnicity and race, of nationality, of sexuality, of 
‘us’ and ‘them’” (Kellner 1995: 1). This potential of the media is independent of 
which country they are produced in or for. Only the discourses are different across 
countries and they shift over time, as what constitutes who ‘we’ are changes 
constantly. Consequently, the creation of an ‘Other’ is always a political as well as 
emotional tool that feeds directly into the creation of a ‘Self’ and its ‘national’ 
identity, helping to forge a sense of belonging for the one and a sense of exclusion 
for the other. In this sense, the media have an important part to play, as they can be 
seen as directly responsible for creating this sense of an imagined community 
(Anderson 1991). But every Self requires an Other, someone who is on the outside, 
someone who is not ‘us’, or in Lacan’s (1968) sense, the ‘big Other’, the Other by 
whom we define who we are. The Self and the Other always exist in binary 
oppositions, and Othering becomes almost a necessary practice to define what it is 
that holds ‘us’ all together, because ‘we are not them’. Very often, this ‘holding 
together’ can take more extreme forms, as whatever is different is stereotyped at 
best and ostracized at worst. To put it into Frederickson’s words, “My theory or 
conception of racism, therefore, has two components: difference and power. It 
originates from a mind-set that regards “them” as different from “us” in ways that 
are permanent and unbridgeable” (2015 [2002]: 9). In fact, the binary of ‘us and 
them’ is such a strong undercurrent within the national discourse that, for example, 
a two-episode documentary series on Britain’s relationship with the EU, broadcast 
by the British public broadcasting service BBC was named Europe: Them or Us – 
thereby constructing a binary opposition between Great Britain and the rest of 
Europe.1 This shows clearly how deeply these binaries underlie the discourses of 
Self and Other and how they are reflected in the media. At the same time, however, 
such notions also hint at another brand of racism, namely cultural racism, or, in 
other words, the extent to which “race is now ‘coded as culture’” (Solomos and 
Back, cited from Fredrickson 2015 [2002]: 8). 
In this paper, I will look at two case studies, Japan and the UK, two ‘island 
nations’ in a geographical sense with a supposed ‘island mentality’ opposite its 
nearest neighbours. However, I will not be looking at how a phenotypically 
different Other, say white people in Japan or Asian people in the UK, are 
represented, but I will set my focus on ‘close Others’, focusing on Othering 
processes when cultural and phenotypical proximity is involved. In other words, 
how do the Japanese represent other East Asians, and how do the British represent 
other Europeans? And how does the construction of Japaneseness and Britishness, 
however vaguely defined, work when cultural proximity is part of the game?  
Even though two ‘island nations’ with a supposed ‘island mentality’ are a 
compelling point of comparison that has already often been made, what is usually 
omitted in arguments about their ‘difference from the rest’ is that the reasons for 
Japan’s alleged distance to its Asian neighbours has a completely different 
historical dimension than Britain’s supposed distance to the rest of Europe. To 
explain those differences, it is necessary to briefly look back at history. 
 
 
 
2. A not so ‘Splendid Isolation’? Japan’s interactions with the Asian 
continent 
Island or not, a complete withdrawal from the affairs on the continent is, 
and has always been, impossible, given Japan’s comparative closeness to the Asian 
mainland. The influence of China, often via a Korean filter, is well visible in Japan, 
as, after all, Japan uses the Chinese script and Confucian philosophy continues to 
be important to this day. However, Japan has always swayed between periods of 
intensive learning and periods of comparative seclusion. The most prolonged time 
of seclusion, termed sakoku (closed country) in Japanese, lasted from the 17th 
century to the 19th century. Japan, however, never shut itself entirely away, trade 
with the rest of the world continued, although to a more limited extent than before. 
With trade did, of course, also come knowledge and skills. Even though foreigners 
were not generally permitted to enter the country, there were annual trade 
delegations in which they did see the rest of Japan. When this period of relative 
seclusion came to an end in 1853, after roughly 250 years, it was the heyday of 
Western imperialism. With the help of ‘gunboat diplomacy’, Japan’s ports were 
opened to a form of trade in which Japan very much was the junior partner. In 
																																								 																				
1 This documentary was hosted by the BBC’s chief political editor Nick Robinson and 
broadcast on 12 and 19 April 2016 on BBC Two. Media discourses in the UK often equate 
Europe with the EU, not making a distinction between the political organization and the 
continent.  
order to not suffer the fate of being colonized, Japan embarked on a mission to 
modernize, and developed from a secluded island in which firearms had been 
banished to a country with a modern army and infrastructure in about half a 
century. As its own progression from ‘regressive’ to ‘modern’ was so rapid, the 
rest of Asia, but mainly China and Korea, were seen to be as backward as Japan 
once used to be. China in particular, was Orientalized – it became an internalized 
vision of Japan’s past, of how Japan itself once was and which consequently 
needed help in evolving (Tanaka 1993). The same imperialist discourses of 
superiority and inferiority as in the ‘West’ began to take hold in Japan, with the 
aim to make Japan one of the players, not one of the playthings, on the imperial 
playground. Ultimately, Japan should rise to ‘free’ the Asian continent from a 
stranglehold of the Western imperial powers. After the first Sino-Japanese War in 
1894/95, in which the Japanese crushingly defeated the Chinese, Taiwan became 
Japan’s first colony. Korea was annexed only fifteen years later, in 1910.  
Subsequently, Japan expanded its influence on the Asian mainland, but not 
benignly, on the contrary, the Japanese colonial rule was exceptionally brutal, 
forcing the colonial citizens in Korea and Taiwan to adopt Japanese names and 
customs as well as limiting the use of their native languages. In 1931, with the 
creation of Manchukuo in what is now China’s Northeast, a nominally independent 
puppet state under Japanese control, Japan arguably became the most important 
player within the Asian context. However, Japan’s appetite to expand its sphere of 
influence was not satisfied, and it marched into China in 1937, embarking on a 
brutal war. It is the lack of long-time engagement during the period of relative 
seclusion, and the subsequent attempt to establish Japan as regional hegemon with 
a feeling of being superior by having avoided colonization, that feeds directly into 
Japan’s troubled relationship with its Asian neighbours today. A perceived lack of 
recognition of responsibility as aggressor during those wars by the Japanese 
political establishment has furthermore alienated the country from Asia. In 
addition, cold-war realpolitik made it difficult for Japan to engage with the 
People’s Republic of China for most of the post-war period. The lack of a regional 
multilateral organization has not helped Japan in finding partners in its former 
enemies and peace treaties that left out controversial issues have all but isolated 
Japan in Asia. The reasons for this isolation are thus pre-dominantly historical, 
mirroring Japan’s prior engagement as imperial power over its neighbours. 
 
 
 
3. Splendidly isolated, but never actually isolated – Britain and Europe 
Conversely, throughout its history, in spite of politically opportune claims 
to the contrary, Britain has never really been isolated from affairs on the European 
continent and has always intervened, or taken sides, when its interests were at 
stake. Be it by fighting over Calais during the 15th and 16th centuries, or during the 
Napoleonic Wars at the beginning of the 19th century, Britain did not ever have a 
period of ‘sakoku’. Nonetheless, the term ‘splendid isolation’ is often heard with 
regards to British politics.  
An isolationalist policy (real or not) is often attributed to the then Prime 
Minister Lord Salisbury in the late 19th century, during the heyday of British 
imperialism. It falls roughly in the time of the Tripartite Intervention of Russia, 
France and Germany preventing Japan from getting a stronger hold on mainland 
Chinese territory after it had won the first Sino-Japanese War in 1895. The 
intervention of the three continental powers in effect made Britain look isolated 
within Europe. This was, however, not to stay the case for long, and the Entente 
Cordiale between France and Britain, signed in 1904, already brought this to a 
conclusion. In effect, however, ‘isolation’ was supposed to mean minimal 
involvement in affairs on the continent. Although ‘isolation’ commonly means an 
“embarrassing lack of friends among the other powers” (Howard 1967: 77), it 
became a popular discourse which continues to resurface to this day. However, 
never did Britain cease to engage in political affairs happening across the English 
Channel, most notably so by fighting against Germany in two world wars and 
being part of the Western bloc during the cold war, with a notable military 
presence on the continent throughout the time. Its supposed isolation, splendid or 
not, is thus often appropriated to define ‘difference’ whenever needed, but it is 
more invented tradition than it ever was a policy.2  
 
 
 
4. Inventing Great Britain – Us and Them in British media 
The wide use of national symbols’ and national denotations in the British 
media is striking. Anything can take the label ‘Great British’. For example, The 
Great British Bake-Off, a programme in which hobby bakers compete for the title 
as the best hobby baker, Great British Menu, in which professional chefs have to 
design a menu for a dinner at a special occasion, or, more recently, Great British 
Garden Revival, Great British Railway Journeys, to name but few of the BBCs 
programmes, which are complemented by Rory Bremner’s Great British Views on 
the private station ITV, respectively A Great British Christmas on another private 
station, Channel 4. Often, the logos of these shows will feature a union flag 
somewhere. While this could be seen as a branding exercise, maybe harking back 
to the days of ‘Cool Britannia’ under Tony Blair’s leadership,3 it also creates the 
feeling of an ‘imagined community’ – the ‘Great British people’ taking part in a 
common activity. Admittedly, the ‘Great Britishness’ is not very well defined and 
simply serves as a label. Nonetheless, it made headlines when a young housewife 
of Bangladeshi origin, wearing a headscarf won The Great British Bake-Off in 
2015 – as it was seen as a step towards acceptance of ‘difference’ and the 
integration of Muslims into British society; and her representation was remarkably 
different from other images of veiled women in the British media.4 
In addition to labelling programmes ‘Great British’, national stereotypes 
will also often be evoked – even if the programme itself does not have anything to 
do with an ‘Other’. A show called Hurricanes and Heatwaves: The Highs and 
Lows of British Weather called the supposed relationships between Britons and 
																																								 																				
2 For a discussion on how the supposed ‘policy’ came about, see Howard 1967, Charmley 
2004 and Charmley 2013 [1999]. 
3 For a brief discussion of Cool Britannia see Kirsch 2015b. 
4 On representations of veiled women in British media see Sadar 2014.  
their climate, “a national obsession”, and the whole programme did not just 
mention how much the British love to talk about the weather, but the significance 
of the forecasts within this ‘national obsession’ was reiterated a number of times. 
In other words, and pointedly put, you have to be British in order to care about the 
weather.  
The ‘singling out’ of Britain as different, special and, indeed, unique is like 
a leitmotif through the British media, private and public alike and the 
aforementioned documentary Europe: Them or Us thus falls on fertile ground. The 
opening words of this documentary use the preconception that Britain is “an island 
apart”. Looking at media discourses on the EU, immigrants from other EU 
countries coming to the UK have taken centre stage. They are often represented 
along the same tropes as during the time that Stuart Hall wrote about racism 
towards immigrants from Britain’s former colonies.5 Immigrants from other EU 
countries are scapegoated, made responsible for ‘stealing jobs’ and ‘bleeding dry’ 
British social systems, reminiscent of the rhetoric heard in the 1970s with respect 
to black people. Ever since the rise of the UK Independence Party,6 UKIP for short, 
discourses on immigration has shifted from the periphery to the centre of the 
debate around Britain’s membership in the European Union and in fact, formed a 
large part of the arguments of the various political campaigns for Britain to leave 
the European Union.7 While it would be for a different paper to look at the 
campaigns in detail, the focus here will be set on what came before the referendum 
about Britain’s EU membership on 23 June 2016, as there was a gradual change in 
the rhetoric about immigrants even before the referendum.8  
Here, a brief look at data is warranted. The share of foreign-born people in 
the UK is about 13%, and 8.5% do not hold British citizenship. As EU citizens do 
not need to apply for residence or work permits, the total number is unclear. Indian 
citizens constitute the largest group of foreign residents, and overall, only about 
half of those 8.5% are from another EU country, with Polish citizens occupying the 
top spot (Rienzo and Vargas-Silva 2016). While the debate about immigration was 
taking off, the media initially distinguished at least between non-EU and EU 
immigrants, and within the EU immigrants, between Eastern and Western 
European. In fact, the debate was heavily biased towards certain EU-member 
states, most notably, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria which bore the brunt of the 
media stereotyping of immigrants. For example, going back to the European 
																																								 																				
5 See, for example, Hall 1978. 
6 The UK Independence Party for a long time campaigned for ‘independence’ from the EU, 
predominantly using immigration as reason for leaving.  
7 Two campaigns are noteworthy in that respect. The official ‘Vote Leave’ campaign, a 
cross-party initiative spearheaded by two conservatives, then Secretary of Justice Michael 
Gove and the current Foreign Minister (then Minister without Portfolio and former Mayor 
of London) Boris Johnson as well as Leave.eu (headed by Nigel Farage) used claims about 
immigration to get the electorate to vote for leave.  
8 Since the initial conception of this paper and its presentation at the conference in 
Bucharest, Britain has voted to leave the European Union. At the point of writing in July 
2016, the status of EU citizens having come to the UK under Freedom of Movement rules, 
is yet to be solved. Racist incidents, however, have increased sharply since the referendum, 
yet the targets of such incidents are not always EU-foreigners. See, for example, Dodd 2016.  
elections in 2014, which coincided with the limitations on Freedom of Movement 
coming to an end for Romania and Bulgaria, the then leader of the Liberal 
Democrats and Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg, faced Nigel Farage, the UKIP 
leader for two televised debates.9 Farage summoned the spectre that “29 million 
Romanians and Bulgarians may come to this country”, upon which Clegg said 
“‘There aren’t even 29 million Romanians and Bulgarians living in Romania and 
Bulgaria. It’s simply not true.’ 
“That’s because two million have already left, Farage replied, and said the 
UK’s borders are now open to 485 million people. ‘We have a total open door, 
unconditionally’” (cited from Holehouse 2014). The Daily Telegraph, a national 
broadsheet newspaper with a conservative agenda, subsequently gave these 
numbers a supposed ‘reality check’ – and concluded, “Strictly speaking, Farage is 
almost right. Romania’s population is 21.7 million and Bulgaria’s is 6.9 million, 
according to the CIA world factbook.” An innocent reader would thus believe the 
Daily Telegraph’s ‘facts’, however, the EU itself gives different data, namely 19.9 
million for Romania and 7.2 for Bulgaria, thus not adding up to 29 million 
(Eurostat 2014). Yet, numbers are drawn in to provide evidence of a threat, which 
is subtly furthered by the Daily Telegraph, as “Farage is almost right.” It is all the 
more noteworthy that the newspaper does not even in any way question the 
complete lack of likelihood that every single individual (inclusive of the 
government and every civil servant!) in Romania and Bulgaria would even 
consider moving to the UK – a claim which was also not contested by Nick Clegg. 
The second number that Farage uses, namely that the UK has an open door to 485 
million people is, crucially, not under the same supposed ‘scrutiny’ by the Daily 
Telegraph. Checking Farage’s claim again against EU population data it also 
becomes clear why, the EU as a whole has 506 million inhabitants, 64 of which are 
British, which means that a maximum of 442 million people can theoretically come 
to live in the UK, not 485. Again, the fact that not every single person in every of 
the EU’s 27 other member states would even want to emigrate, let alone to the UK, 
is left uncontested.10 
The debates leading up to the elections for the European Parliament in 
2014 has been well documented by previous research, and Fox, Moroşanu and 
Szilassy conclude, “that anti-immigrant rhetoric proffered by politicians and 
propagated by the media has contributed to a general climate of hostility that 
sanctions the moralising, differentiation of (if not actual discrimination against) 
East Europeans” (Spigelman 2013, Light and Young 2009, cited from Fox et al. 
2015: 730). The “category conflation” also observed by Fox et al. (2012: 688) thus 
initially referred to only Eastern European immigrants – as they were all tarred 
with the same brush and the reasons for emigration (ranging from marriage to 
doing a degree to unskilled and skilled labour) were completely disregarded.  
																																								 																				
9 At the time, Nick Clegg was one of the most vocal proponents of EU membership for the 
UK.  
10 This strategy was used again by one of the leading figures in the Vote Leave campaign, 
then Secretary of Justice Michael Gove in an article for a tabloid, the Daily Mail, in April 
of 2016, in which he claimed 88 million Turkish and Albanian people were next to come to 
UK (Gove 2016). 
The categories collapsed even further, when in July 2015, then Prime 
Minister David Cameron spoke about ‘migrants’ in Calais as “a swarm of people” 
only waiting to come to the UK, drawing in severe criticism about ‘dehumanising’ 
these people, none of whom is an EU citizen (Elgot and Taylor 2015). Note, 
however, the use of the term ‘migrants’ which has become a pars pro toto 
definition for anyone foreign coming to the UK, and Cameron’s choice of words, 
reminiscent of the 1970s and 1980s, when “[the] theme of outnumbering [was] a 
mainstay of white racial politics, becoming the organising principle of British post-
war debate, moving from discussion of ‘overcrowding’ (especially in relation to 
housing) to the language of ‘flooding’ and ‘swamping’ used respectively by Enoch 
Powell and Margaret Thatcher” (Fryer 1984, Miles and Phizacklea 1984, cited 
from Dyer 2006 [1997]: 26). 
To complicate matters, Syrian war refugees on the European continent 
have also come to be known as ‘migrants’ in the UK media,11  blurring the 
boundaries between the various groups of people even further. Indeed, a former 
government minister, Owen Paterson, suggested that the Syrian ‘migrants’ would 
apply for German citizenship so that they could come to the UK (Khomami 2016) 
– thus almost necessitating the conflation of categories. The sole term in use is now 
migrants, completely devoid of a denotation of origin or purpose of migration. 
While indeed, academically, the term migrant is politically neutral and simply 
means someone migrating (regardless of purpose), this hiding behind a technical 
term and seeming ‘political correctness’ also has the flipside of category conflation 
and ‘blanket Othering’ of diverse groups of people with completely different aims 
and purposes – and thus a real debate about the various forms of migration is 
prevented.  
Fast forward to the last example of ‘Othering’ of immigrants. On 12 May 
2016, the Office for National Statistics, ONS, released data on how many 
immigrants from other EU countries had actually applied for a National Insurance 
Number – and it yielded, that actually about a million more EU-citizens had a 
National Insurance Number than previously thought. On 13 May, this topic 
dominated the headlines. The Daily Telegraph demanded an apology, the Daily 
Mail talked about a ‘cover up’, the Sun about a ‘migrant swindle’ and, finally, the 
Daily Express simply called those ‘hidden migrants’. To be fair, the left-wing 
Guardian did use this data to run a warning by the former conservative Prime 
Minister John Major, namely that the Vote Leave campaign risked turning into 
UKIP. It did not feature as front page news on the Financial Times, the Times, the 
Metro, the Daily Star, the Daily Mirror, or i.12  
Again, however, the categories have become even more conflated – by 
now, we are only talking about immigrants from other EU countries, whose “[…] 
shared whiteness operat[es] as a basis of inclusion, but cultural difference […] as a 
criterion for exclusion.” (Fox et al. 2012: 691). The number of immigrants is 
																																								 																				
11 See, for example, Posener 2016.  
12 The BBC publishes scans of the front pages of the main national newspapers, so the 
papers of the 13 May 2016 may no longer be available. It nonetheless provides a good 
overview of what is being picked up on by both conservative and left-wing papers. See 
BBC 2016.  
continuously used to conjure a threat, appealing to the emotions of the audiences, 
as if ‘Britishness’, so vigorously upheld by the media, is under threat by similar 
looking, yet culturally slightly distinct people. An imbalance of power is of course 
innate to these discourses – Britain becomes the land of milk and honey, sought for 
by the invariably poor(er) ‘EU-migrants’. Yet, at the same time the media are so 
passionately involved in generating an ‘Other’ that Britishness is defined only by 
exclusion of the Other. It becomes everything ‘non-EU’ and everything ‘non-
foreign’, making it even vaguer than it was before. Brian Massumi sums this up 
when looking at how ‘terrorist events’ are felt, and very similar processes are at 
play here, namely “mass affective production of felt threat-potential engulfs the 
(f)actuality of the comparatively small number of incidents where danger 
materialized. They blend together in a shared atmosphere of fear” (Massumi 2010: 
61).  
 
 
 
5. Inventing an ‘Other’ – Japanese imaginations of other Asian 
countries 
By contrast, the population of Japan is by far more ethnically homogenous 
than the UK, as only about 2% of people in Japan are of foreign origin, most of 
which do come from China and Korea – and thus visibly blend in, just like most 
EU immigrants would simply blend in in the UK. Discourses of national 
homogeneity and cultural uniqueness have long been ingrained into the Japanese 
national identity, underpinned by countless books which highlight cultural 
difference to the rest of the world. In addition to that, the Japanese media are also 
very ‘insular’ and possibly among the least connected in the world. They are 
focused on the domestic market and matters relating to foreign countries are barely 
reported. If at all, US politics feature more. However, in spite of the Cool Japan 
soft power policy which the previous government initiated to get more tourists to 
come to Japan, the myth of Japanese ‘uniqueness’ is carefully upheld (Kirsch 
2015b). 
When it came to a rapprochement of Japan and its Asian neighbours in the 
1990s, the boundaries established in the cold war had begun to weaken. 
Immigration increased and within a short period of time the number of foreigners 
in Japan doubled – from 1% to 2%. The debate that the UK saw in the 1950s, 60s 
and 70s with regards to immigration from former colonies and is having now with 
regards to immigration from other EU countries thus happened in the 1990s in 
Japan, leaving us with a different time frame as point of comparison. The popular 
and populist writings on Japan that saw the country as almost irreconcilably 
different from the rest of the world triggered a countermovement – that of 
internationalization. The Japanese word, kokusaika, became a buzzword within 
society, and it was clearly the aim of the internationalists to get more foreigners 
into Japan to make it more diverse. Several scholarship programmes still taking 
students to Japan as exchange or full-time students date back to that period of 
economic growth and kokusaika. However, as the numbers of foreigners began to 
visibly increase, of course, the debate about those Others also began. A small, but 
decisive ‘Asia boom’ evolved in the early 1990s, when Japanese cinema took the 
lead in presenting more stories about other Asian countries. This ‘Asia boom’ 
eventually came to penetrate all media and in some of its forms weakened the 
notion that Japanese culture is different from the rest of the world – by simply 
acknowledging cultural similarities with its Asian neighbours (Kirsch 2015a).  
It is worthy of notice that it was fiction that picked up on the topos of 
immigration to Japan, which is a marked difference to the UK – where fictional 
genres do barely represent immigration from other EU countries. The first 
storylines which incorporated Asian Otherness in Japan showed other Asian 
characters coming to Japan to study (thus improving themselves) and return home 
(to improve their countries). Japan stood as a beacon of modernity within Asia, a 
country to which other Asians could look up to, a model to emulate (Kirsch 2015a). 
As the number of immigrants increased, the debate in both fiction as well as in the 
news media moved away from students coming to study in Japan, to criminals 
following in their wake13 – which is also an undercurrent to the debate in the UK.14  
Subsequently, the media began to highlight the supposed high number of 
criminals among foreigners – like in the case of the UK, using numbers to their 
advantage. Visa violations were included in the crime statistics, which, by nature, 
is a crime only a foreigner can commit, so the ratio was artificially inflated. The 
data was thus used to criminalize foreigners in general, but foreigners from other 
Asian countries in particular. Crucially, statistics were never compared (because it 
would have yielded the result that, visa issues set aside, foreigners do not commit 
more crimes than the Japanese). Yamamoto Ryoko (2004) called this a game in 
which media and politicians were complicit in scapegoating foreigners in order to 
toughen immigration laws.  
This ongoing debate culminated in the publication of a magazine, called 
Gaijin hanzai ura fairu (The hidden files of foreign criminality) in 2007 in which 
some areas of Tokyo were designated to be ‘lawless zones’ and thus ‘no-go areas’, 
due to the activity of foreign gangs. On the back cover of the magazine, foreigners 
were rated by their ‘dangerousness’, creating the impression that every foreign 
national is by definition evil (Washinton ed. 2007, Arudou 2007, Kirsch 2015a). 
Reasons for migration to Japan were drowned in the debate on criminality, 
conflating the categories between the various groups of immigrants, students, 
workers, foreign spouses. However, while in the UK a tendency to cover every 
‘Other’ with the general term of ‘migrant’, the Japanese debate made it clear that 
certain ethnicities were supposedly more dangerous than others, with the Chinese 
being ‘most dangerous’. The few foreign criminals that ended up making 
headlines, were consequently always denoted by their nationality, they were not 
‘just criminal’, but ‘Chinese and criminal’, for example. This tendency could not 
only be observed within the news media, but films that were produced around that 
time interestingly also picked up the foreign criminality tropes, furthering the fear 
																																								 																				
13 See, for example, Japan Times 2002. In addition, a database search on Asahi Kikuzō 
Visual II (the archives of the various outlets of the Asahi Group, one of the biggest 
newspaper/magazine publishers in Japan), set at 1989-2016 generates 897 hits (542 
between 1989 and 2002), indicating how immensely important this topic continues to be.  
14 Cases of foreign criminality, particularly of one Latvian man killing a school girl were 
used by the campaigns for Britain to leave the European Union (Grierson 2016).  
of foreigners even further. The dichotomies were clear-cut, the Japanese stayed on 
moral high ground, as those not committing crimes (or lesser ones) opposite 
extremely cruel Asian foreigners (Kirsch 2015a).  
As the political relationship between Japan and China worsened, the 
foreigners most often shown as criminal were the Chinese. As Chinese gangs 
supposedly took hold of one particular area of Tokyo, called Kabukichō, fiction 
picked up on that too, by representing the Chinese as members of gangs, aiming to 
take over Japan. Nationalist slogans, namely, that Japan would be protected and the 
foreigners expelled were put into the mouths of Japanese characters (Kirsch 
2015a). Unlike news media, fiction could and did take the liberty of making 
politically not so correct statements, adding a second layer to the debate by openly 
voicing slogans that news media would refrain from using.  
Isolated incidents in which foreigners did indeed commit a crime, were 
exaggerated, and the media stoked the fire. Fear of foreigners in general rose,15 so 
Brian Massumi’s above quote also applies in the case of Japan. But, unlike the UK 
which has a fairly stable birth rate, Japan has one of the lowest in the world, and its 
workforce is shrinking. At around the time that Japan began to feel the bite of the 
second decade of economic slowdown, the dawn of the new millennium, 
immigration, particularly from low-income countries in the rest of Asia, came to be 
discussed as a necessity to reinvigorate the economy. The current government has 
reacted by creating a new visa category in 2015, namely for foreign nurses and 
caregivers to come to Japan temporarily – yet at the same time, the language 
barrier is so high that few qualify (Osaki 2015a).  
The debate on immigration has more or less vanished out of the 
mainstream media, but a positive counter-narrative has yet to kick off.16 It almost 
seems as if after a long period of struggle and scapegoating, and feeling superior to 
the rest of the continent, Japan seems to have accepted that immigration is to some 
extent needed to maintain its economic prowess. However, the debate about 
foreign criminality has not subsided and immigration is still looked at askance, but 
it has moved away from the mainstream media to the internet. Hateful and racist 
tweets, online blogs and bulletin boards have become the main problem, 
stereotypes about foreigners from Korea and China are perpetuated online.17 In 
Japan, too, categories are being conflated, as China and Korea are singled out as 
countries – with the various immigrants coming from those countries simply being 
labelled ‘Korean’ or ‘Chinese’ regardless of their purpose of stay. This is 
particularly an issue as Japan has a large Korean minority – which has been 
completely socialized in Japan. The scapegoating of foreigners has thus not ended, 
but the outlets have changed. In sum, Japan has thus very similar problems in 
representing its close Others – cultural proximity was only initially acknowledged, 
in the rest of the debate, foreigners remained a pale sphere of projection of 
everything the Self was not, appropriated to highlight the moral superiority of the 
																																								 																				
15 A survey on public safety conducted in 2007 yielded that 55.1% of respondents listed 
foreign criminality as a reason for not feeling ‘safe’ anymore (Cabinet Office Japan 2007). 
16 Most recently in 2015, the government is again seeking to limit immigration. See Osaki 
2015b.  
17 See, for example, Iwabuchi and Takezawa 2015.  
Japanese. Nationalistic views of not wanting foreigners in the country drowned out 
the debate on the benefits of immigration.  
 
 
 
6. Conclusion – Who are ‘we’?  
So, who are ‘we’? What has become clear throughout is that the ‘Other’ 
remains a construct of ‘Ourselves’ and every dialogue about, and with, the Other is 
always first and foremost also about and with ‘Ourselves’. The target may change, 
as is the case in Britain, in which the scapegoating of foreigners shifted from 
immigrants of its former colonies to include immigrants from other EU-countries. 
Although written for a very different context, namely Britain in the 1970s, Stuart 
Hall’s (1978) work on ‘racism’ still has validity yet the boundaries of what 
constitutes racism have shifted. It is no longer simply defined by a different skin 
colour, but by culture and language. Who is Self and who is Other heavily depends 
on the situation and categories collapse on both sides. That the Self can be as 
heterogeneous as the Other, can harbour very different beliefs and have very 
different needs goes without saying, yet homogenization happens on both sides, 
and two groups of people simply oppose each other.  
Japan and the UK are merely two examples of how ‘migrants’ are being 
dealt with in the media. Each and every single country in the world has had, or still 
has, similar problems and the appropriation of immigration within the media 
certainly warrants for a wider study, particularly since nationalist movements 
continue to be on the rise throughout the world – and in many cases, a fear of 
strangers and their purposes, regardless of origin, will help to define ‘who we are’. 
The media and their role in shaping identities in opposition to Others can thus not 
be ignored, because this is where the debates are played out and identities are 
negotiated.  
But in all cases, emotions always matter, be it by feeling different to an 
‘Other’, or by a sense of belonging to a certain group of people. If an affective 
response can be created, by generating fear or threat, or by making people ‘feel 
good’ about themselves, then the Other has served its purpose. It may thus be 
fitting to leave the last words to John Cleese, explaining extremism: “What we 
never hear about extremism is its advantages. Well, the biggest advantage of 
extremism is that it makes you feel good, because it provides you with enemies” 
(Cleese n.d.).  
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